Learning Objectives

• Contrast expansionary monetary policy and contractionary monetary policy
• Explain how monetary policy impacts interest rates and aggregate demand
• Evaluate Federal Reserve decisions over the last 40 years
• Explain the significance of quantitative easing (QE)

The Effect of Monetary Policy on Interest Rates

Consider the market for loanable bank funds, shown in Figure 14.7. The original equilibrium (E₀) occurs at an interest rate of 8 percent and a quantity of funds loaned and borrowed of $10 billion. An expansionary monetary policy will shift the supply of loanable funds to the right from the original supply curve (S₀) to S₁, leading to an equilibrium (E₁) with a lower interest rate of 6 percent and a quantity of funds loaned of $14 billion. Conversely, a contractionary monetary policy will shift the supply of loanable funds to the left from the original supply curve (S₀) to S₂, leading to an equilibrium (E₂) with a higher interest rate of 10 percent and a quantity of funds loaned of $8 billion.

Figure 14.7 Monetary Policy and Interest Rates The original equilibrium occurs at E₀. An expansionary monetary policy will shift the supply of loanable funds to the right from the original supply curve (S₀) to the new supply curve (S₁) and to a new equilibrium of E₁, reducing the interest rate from 8 percent to 6 percent. A contractionary monetary policy will shift the supply of loanable funds to the left from the original supply curve (S₀) to the new supply (S₂) and raise the interest rate from 8 percent to 10 percent.

So how does a central bank raise interest rates? When describing the monetary policy actions taken by a central bank, it is common to hear that the central bank “raised interest rates” or “lowered interest rates.” We need to be clear about this: more precisely, through open market operations the central bank changes bank reserves in a way that affects the supply curve of loanable funds. As a result, interest rates change, as shown in Figure 14.7. If they do not meet the Fed’s target, the Fed can supply more or less reserves until interest rates do.

Recall that the specific interest rate the Fed targets is the federal funds rate. The Federal Reserve has, since 1995, established its target federal funds rate in advance of any open market operations.

Of course, financial markets display a wide range of interest rates, representing borrowers with different risk premiums and loans that are to be repaid over different periods of time. In general, when the federal funds rate drops substantially, other interest rates drop, too, and when the federal funds rate rises, other interest rates rise. However, a fall or rise of one percentage point in the federal funds rate—which, remember, is for borrowing overnight—will typically have an effect of less than one percentage point on a 30-year loan to purchase a house or a three-year loan to purchase a car. Monetary policy can push the entire spectrum of interest rates higher or lower, but the specific interest rates are set by the forces of supply and demand in those specific markets for lending and borrowing.

Remember that inflation also has an impact on interest rates. The real interest rate is measured as the nominal, or stated, interest rate minus the rate of inflation. For example, a borrower signs a loan contract and agrees to pay an interest rate of 5 percent a year. In this case, the nominal or stated interest rate is 5 percent. If over the period of the loan the inflation rate is 3 percent, then the real interest rate is 2 percent. Given some rate of inflation, in specific lending and borrowing markets where there is an equilibrium nominal rate of interest, there is also an equilibrium real rate of interest. Thus, as the central bank uses monetary policy to change the federal funds rate in order to affect equilibrium nominal interest rates, it will also affect equilibrium real interest rates as well.

The Effect of Monetary Policy on Aggregate Demand

Monetary policy affects interest rates and the available quantity of loanable funds, which in turn affects several components of aggregate demand. Tight or contractionary monetary policy that leads to higher interest rates and a reduced quantity of loanable funds will reduce two components of aggregate demand. Business investment will decline because it is less attractive for firms to borrow money, and even firms that have money will notice that, with higher interest rates, it is relatively more attractive to put those funds in a financial investment than to make an investment in physical capital. In addition, higher interest rates will discourage consumer borrowing for big-ticket items like houses and cars. Conversely, loose or expansionary monetary policy that leads to lower interest rates and a higher quantity of loanable funds will tend to increase business investment and consumer borrowing for big-ticket items.

If the economy is suffering a recession and high unemployment, with output below potential GDP, expansionary monetary policy can help the economy return to potential GDP. Figure 14.8 (a) illustrates this situation. This example uses a short-run upward-sloping Keynesian aggregate supply curve (SRAS). The original equilibrium during a recession of E₀ occurs at an output level of 600. An expansionary monetary policy will reduce interest rates and stimulate investment and consumption spending, causing the original aggregate demand curve (AD₀) to shift right to AD₁, so that the new equilibrium (E₁) occurs at the potential GDP level of 700.

Figure 14.8 Expansionary or Contractionary Monetary Policy (a) The economy is originally in a recession with the equilibrium output and price level shown at E₀. Expansionary monetary policy will reduce interest rates and shift aggregate demand to the right, from AD₀ to AD₁, leading to the new equilibrium (E₁) at the potential GDP level of output with a relatively small rise in the price level. (b) The economy is originally producing above the potential GDP level of output at the equilibrium E₀ and is experiencing pressures for an inflationary rise in the price level. Contractionary monetary policy will shift aggregate demand to the left from AD₀ to AD₁, thus leading to a new equilibrium (E₁) at the potential GDP level of output.

Conversely, if an economy is producing at a quantity of output above its potential GDP, a contractionary monetary policy can reduce the inflationary pressures for a rising price level. In Figure 14.8 (b), the original equilibrium (E₀) occurs at an output of 750, which is above potential GDP. A contractionary monetary policy will raise interest rates, discourage borrowing for investment and consumption spending, and cause the original demand curve (AD₀) to shift left to AD₁, so that the new equilibrium (E₁) occurs at the potential GDP level of 700.

These examples suggest that monetary policy should be countercyclical, that is, it should act to counterbalance the business cycles of economic downturns and upswings. Monetary policy should be loosened when a recession has caused unemployment to increase and tightened when inflation threatens. Of course, countercyclical policy does pose a danger of overreaction. If loose monetary policy seeking to end a recession goes too far, it may push aggregate demand so far to the right that it triggers inflation. If tight monetary policy seeking to reduce inflation goes too far, it may push aggregate demand so far to the left that a recession begins. Figure 14.9 (a) summarizes the chain of effects that connect loose and tight monetary policy to changes in output and the price level.

Figure 14.9 The Pathways of Monetary Policy (a) In expansionary monetary policy, the central bank causes the supply of money and loanable funds to increase, which lowers the interest rate, stimulating additional borrowing for investment and consumption and shifting aggregate demand right. The result is a higher price level and, at least in the short run, higher real GDP. (b) In contractionary monetary policy, the central bank causes the supply of money and credit in the economy to decrease, which raises the interest rate, discouraging borrowing for investment and consumption and shifting aggregate demand left. The result is a lower price level and, at least in the short run, lower real GDP.

Federal Reserve Actions Over the Last Four Decades

For the period from the mid-1970s up through the end of 2007, Federal Reserve monetary policy can largely be summed up by looking at how it targeted the federal funds interest rate using open market operations.

Of course, telling the story of the U.S. economy since 1975 in terms of Federal Reserve actions leaves out many other macroeconomic factors that were influencing unemployment, recession, economic growth, and inflation over this time. The nine episodes of Federal Reserve action outlined in the sections below also demonstrate that the central bank should be considered one of the leading actors influencing the macro economy. As noted earlier, the single person with the greatest power to influence the U.S. economy is probably the chairperson of the Federal Reserve.

Figure 14.10 shows how the Federal Reserve has carried out monetary policy by targeting the federal funds interest rate in the last few decades. The graph shows the federal funds interest rate—remember, this interest rate is set through open market operations—the unemployment rate, and the inflation rate since 1975. Different episodes of monetary policy during this period are indicated in the figure.

Figure 14.10 Monetary Policy, Unemployment, and Inflation In the episodes shown here, the Federal Reserve typically reacted to higher inflation with a contractionary monetary policy and a higher interest rate, and reacted to higher unemployment with an expansionary monetary policy and a lower interest rate.

Episode 1

Consider Episode 1 in the late 1970s. The rate of inflation was very high, exceeding 10 percent in 1979 and 1980, so the Federal Reserve used tight monetary policy to raise interest rates, with the federal funds rate rising from 5.5 percent in 1977 to 16.4 percent in 1981. By 1983, inflation was down to 3.2 percent, but aggregate demand contracted sharply enough that back-to-back recessions occurred in 1980 and in 1981–1982, and the unemployment rate rose from 5.8 percent in 1979 to 9.7 percent in 1982.

Episode 2

In Episode 2, when the Federal Reserve was persuaded in the early 1980s that inflation was declining, the Fed began slashing interest rates to reduce unemployment. The federal funds interest rate fell from 16.4 percent in 1981 to 6.8 percent in 1986. By 1986 or so, inflation had fallen to about 2 percent and the unemployment rate had come down to 7 percent, and was still falling.

Episode 3

However, in Episode 3 in the late 1980s, inflation appeared to be creeping up again, rising from 2 percent in 1986 up toward 5 percent by 1989. In response, the Federal Reserve used contractionary monetary policy to raise the federal funds rates from 6.6 percent in 1987 to 9.2 percent in 1989. The tighter monetary policy stopped inflation, which fell from above 5 percent in 1990 to under 3 percent in 1992, but it also helped to cause the recession of 1990–1991, and the unemployment rate rose from 5.3 percent in 1989 to 7.5 percent by 1992.

Episode 4

In Episode 4, in the early 1990s, when the Federal Reserve was confident that inflation was back under control, it reduced interest rates, with the federal funds interest rate falling from 8.1 percent in 1990 to 3.5 percent in 1992. As the economy expanded, the unemployment rate declined from 7.5 percent in 1992 to less than 5 percent by 1997.

Episodes 5 and 6

In Episodes 5 and 6, the Federal Reserve perceived a risk of inflation and raised the federal funds rate from 3 percent to 5.8 percent from 1993 to 1995. Inflation did not rise, and the period of economic growth during the 1990s continued. Then in 1999 and 2000, the Fed was concerned that inflation seemed to be creeping up, so it raised the federal funds interest rate from 4.6 percent in December 1998 to 6.5 percent in June 2000. By early 2001, inflation was declining again, but a recession occurred in 2001. Between 2000 and 2002, the unemployment rate rose from 4.0 percent to 5.8 percent.

Episodes 7 and 8

In Episodes 7 and 8, the Federal Reserve conducted a loose monetary policy and slashed the federal funds rate from 6.2 percent in 2000 to just 1.7 percent in 2002, and then again to 1 percent in 2003. It actually did this because of fear of Japan-style deflation: This persuaded it to lower the Fed funds further than they otherwise would have. The recession ended, but unemployment rates were slow to decline in the early 2000s. Finally, in 2004, the unemployment rate declined and the Federal Reserve began to raise the federal funds rate until it reached 5 percent by 2007.

Episode 9

In Episode 9, as the Great Recession took hold in 2008, the Federal Reserve was quick to slash interest rates, taking them down to 2 percent in 2008 and to nearly 0 percent in 2009. When the Fed had taken interest rates down to near zero by December 2008, the economy was still deep in recession. Open market operations could not make the interest rate turn negative. The Federal Reserve had to think “outside the box.”

Quantitative Easing

The most powerful and commonly used of the three traditional tools of monetary policy—open market operations—works by expanding or contracting the money supply in a way that influences the interest rate. In late 2008, as the U.S. economy struggled with recession, the Federal Reserve had already reduced the interest rate to near-zero. With the recession ongoing, the Fed decided to adopt an innovative and nontraditional policy known as quantitative easing (QE). This is the purchase of long-term government and private mortgage-backed securities by central banks to make credit available so as to stimulate aggregate demand.

Quantitative easing differed from traditional monetary policy in several key ways. First, it involved the Fed purchasing long-term Treasury bonds, rather than short-term Treasury bills. In 2008, however, it was impossible to stimulate the economy any further by lowering short-term rates because they were already as low as they could get. Read the closing Bring It Home feature for more on this. Therefore, Bernanke sought to lower long-term rates using quantitative easing.

This leads to a second way QE is different from traditional monetary policy. Instead of purchasing Treasury securities, the Fed also began purchasing private mortgage–backed securities, something it had never done before. During the financial crisis, which precipitated the recession, mortgage–backed securities were termed toxic assets because when the housing market collapsed, no one knew what these securities were worth, which put the financial institutions that were holding those securities on very shaky ground. By offering to purchase mortgage-backed securities, the Fed was both pushing long-term interest rates down and removing possibly toxic assets from the balance sheets of private financial firms, which would strengthen the financial system.

Quantitative easing (QE) occurred in three episodes:

1. During QE₁, which began in November 2008, the Fed purchased $600 billion in mortgage-backed securities from government enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
2. In November 2010, the Fed began QE₂, in which it purchased $600 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds.
3. QE₃ began in September 2012, when the Fed commenced purchasing $40 billion of additional mortgage-backed securities per month. This amount was increased in December 2012 to $85 billion per month. The Fed stated that, when economic conditions permit, it would begin tapering or reducing the monthly purchases. By October 2014, the Fed had announced the final $15 billion purchase of bonds, ending quantitative easing.

The quantitative easing policies adopted by the Federal Reserve—and by other central banks around the world—are usually thought of as temporary emergency measures. If these steps are, indeed, to be temporary, then the Federal Reserve will need to stop making these additional loans and sell off the financial securities it has accumulated. The concern is that the process of quantitative easing may prove more difficult to reverse than it was to enact. The evidence suggests that QE₁ was somewhat successful, but that QE₂ and QE₃ have been less so.